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Abstract
We study the effect of warfare on the development of state capacity and representative institutions
using novel data on cities and territories in the German lands between 1200 and 1750. More
specifically, we show that cities with a higher conflict exposure establish more sophisticated tax
systems, but also develop larger councils, councils that are more likely to be elected by citizens,
and more likely to be independent of other local institutions. These results are consistent with the
idea of a trade-off between more efficient taxation and power sharing proposed in earlier work. We
make headway on establishing a causal role of wars by using changes to German nobles’ positions
within the European nobility network to instrument for conflict.
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1 Introduction
In the European context it has long been argued that wars fostered state formation (Tilly, 1975).
This includes the political representation of citizens in national assemblies (Downing, 1993; Stasav-
age, 2010) and the development of sophisticated nation-wide systems of taxation to broaden the
tax base and to raise tax revenues, for instance via income taxes.1 Examples of this are the first
income taxes in Britain due to the Napoleonic Wars, or in the U.S. at the start of the Civil War
(Besley and Persson, 2009).
Representative political institutions and sophisticated tax systems, however, evolved much ear-
lier at the sub-national level, namely in the cities (Stasavage, 2011),2 long before the occurrence of
such institutions at the national level in the 18th and 19th century. For example, after a 20-months
long siege by the troops of the Archbishop of Cologne in 1389, the city of Dortmund introduced a
5% income tax in 1393 to cope with the wartime debt burden. In 1400, the citizens of Dortmund
revolted and demanded more representation on the city council (Rat). This led to a reform of the
council to include the so-called Zwölfer (“The Twelve”) who henceforth represented the citizens’
interest.
What explains this relationship between warfare, inclusive political institutions, and more effi-
cient systems of taxation at the local level? Tilly (1975) hypothesizes that rulers, especially those
of smaller polities with a weaker position, required the consent of their people to increase tax rev-
enues to finance warfare.3 To acquire such consent, Tilly claims that rulers offered political powers
in exchange. Wars are therefore crucial shocks to disturb equilibria in which rulers first tax sectors
1Income taxes are sophisticated compared to simpler forms of taxation like trade or head taxes that do not require
an infrastructure to survey the wealth or income of the population. See Besley and Persson (2013, p. 59): “To collect
trade taxes just requires being able to observe trade flows at major shipping ports. Although trade taxes may encour-
age smuggling, this is a much easier proposition than collecting income taxes, which requires major investments in
enforcement and compliance structures throughout the entire economy.”
2See Wahl (2018) for work on the evolution of representative political institutions in German cities during the
Middle Ages.
3Stasavage (2011) argues that smaller city states were able to build up fiscal apparatuses because they were smaller
and could more easily solve the coordination between taxation and spending priorities. Rubin (2017) makes the
more general observation that rulers need legitimacy and coercive power. Assemblies can provide both: democratic
legitimacy and tax revenue needed to coerce.
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of the economy over which they have more power,4 as opposed to sectors where increased taxation
requires the consent of the people which has to be acquired by surrendering political powers. Since
wars were expensive, they easily forced rulers to raise tax revenues beyond what could be obtained
without asking for consent.
This theory can potentially explain the effect of warfare on the evolution of inclusive political
institutions and the development of more elaborate forms of taxation at the local level much before
the 19th century when such institutions evolved at the national level. However, so far there is no
empirical evidence to support it.
Studying how warfare affected the evolution of political institutions and tax systems at the sub-
national and especially at the city level is challenging. Oftentimes such data is hard to find for a
sufficiently large sample and period of time. However, the importance of cities as precursors of
nation-wide systems of sophisticated taxation and representative political institutions can hardly
be overstated. In pre-industrial Europe, cities were the driver of political and economic innovation
(Wahl, 2018), and the primary providers of fast tax revenues to finance warfare (Van Zanden,
Buringh and Bosker, 2012). They were also fundamental drivers of growth. Bosker, Buringh and
van Zanden (2013) argue that local participative institutions in cities explain the urban development
that allowed Europe to eventually outpace the Islamic world. This view is consistent with recent
theories on citizens’ involvement in governing and the efficiency of taxation (Acemoglu, Ticchi
and Vindigni, 2011).
In this paper, we present novel data on the universe of cities in the German Lands from 1200
to 1750 which we digitized from city-level records. We show that higher incidences of violent
conflicts had a positive effect on the evolution of representative political institutions and sophis-
ticated tax systems at the local level. Information on cities is observed in every decade for more
than 2,300 cities and was obtained from the Deutsches Städtebuch Keyser (1939-1974). Our data
have three important features that allow us to study the relation between warfare, representative
political institutions, and sophisticated methods of taxation at a granular level.
4As in the two-sector model of Hoffman and Rosenthal (1997) where a ruler controls one sector which he can tax
freely while in the other sector the consent of the elite is required.
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First, we observe crucial information each city’s political institutions to measure the citizen’s
electoral power, representativeness of institutions, and the division of power. To capture citizen’s
electoral power we consider as outcome whether citizens could elect their city council without the
interference of the local ruler. Representativeness is proxied by the size of the council which has
been argued to be positively related (Kjaer and Elklit, 2014). We measure the division of power by
considering councils on which neither members of the executive nor the judiciary are present. Our
focus on councils as representative political institutions is motivated by the fact that they were the
“chief means of seeking consent [to tax] at which representatives from different parts of a society
would be able to express themselves. (Stasavage, 2016, p. 147).
Second, we collected detailed information on the number and types of taxes levied in 267 large
cities that are also covered in Bairoch, Batou and Chèvre (1988). We construct measures of the
sophistication of a city’s tax system as the share of income, wealth, and inheritance taxes among
the total taxes raised. This provides us with a novel way to assess the impact of warfare on a city’s
tax base and the quality of its taxes over a long period of time and much before the introduction of
nation-wide systems of income taxes in the 18th and 19th century.
Third, we observe violent conflicts that directly affect the city, such as sieges, nearby battles,
sackings, or (partial) destruction. We are the first to extend data on violent conflicts back to the
13th century and to provide a level of detail on the types of conflicts that is not available in con-
ventionally used sources that focus on battles, such as Clodfelter (2008).
A key challenge for identification is the potential endogeneity between warfare and political
institutions and taxation. This may be due to issues of reverse causality as conflict may not only
force the evolution of more efficient tax systems, but that a higher ability to increase tax revenues
could lead to increased participation in wars. A similar argument is made by Gennaioli and Voth
(2015) in the context of warfare and state capacity.
To give our estimates a causal interpretation, we exploit changes in the nobility networks across
more than 680,000 German and European nobles to instrument for conflict intensities. To make
this instrument arguably more plausible, we control for the number of direct links of the nobles.
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This means that we exploit variation in the parts of the network that are not a direct choice of the
nobles themselves (as their direct links would be) but that affect their centrality in the network. We
show that as the centrality of a territory’s nobles decreases, the more likely it is to be involved in
subsequent violent conflicts.5
We find positive and significant effects of conflict intensity faced by cities and the evolution
of representative political institutions and a more sophisticated tax system. We measure conflict
intensity as the share of cities of a territory that experience a violent conflict in a given decade.
Our instrumental variables regressions show that a one percentage point increase in this conflict
measure is associated with a 14.8% increase in the probability that citizens elect the council without
interference of the local ruler, a 13% increase in the size of the council, and a 23% decrease
in the probability that the executive and judiciary are represented on the council relative to the
outcome averages. These findings are robust to different definitions of territories or the instrument,
assignment of conflicts from the territory to the city-level, or sample composition. Our results can
explain 27% of the overall increase in citizens electing their councils, and 20% in the overall
increase of council sizes between 1200 and 1750. While the independence of councils over this
time period has declined, it would have declined 24% more in the absence of all warfare over the
entire period.
The results on the relation between warfare and taxes show a negative effect on the number of
taxes raised by a city but an increase in the efficiency of the tax system. We also find evidence
of long-term dynamics that reinforce this development. Fifty years later, a one percentage point
increase in warfare is associated with an increase in the share of sophisticated taxes by 17 to
24%. This result can explain between 33 and 57% in the overall increase in sophisticated forms of
taxation between 1200 and 1750.
We contribute to the following strands of the literature.
First, based on the theoretical work by Tilly (1975, 1990) a rich empirical literature has studied
the relation between warfare and political institutions (e.g. Downing, 1993; Dincecco, Federico
5Benzell and Cooke (2018) show a link between cross-country kinship ties among European monarchs and reduced
conflict intensity in Europe over time.
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and Vindigni, 2011; Karaman and Pamuk, 2013; Dincecco and Wang, 2018). However, Stasavage
(2016, p. 155) points out that so far, “the evidence suggests some causal link between warfare and
representative institutions, although of course we do not know in which direction causality runs.”
We therefore contribute two insights to this debate by i) providing evidence of a positive causal
effect that runs from warfare to representative political institutions and ii) by presenting the first
evidence of this relationship using granular sub-national data over a long period of time.
Second, previous work studying the impact of warfare on taxation has mainly focused on tax
revenue and on the quantity rather than the quality of taxes (e.g. Besley and Persson, 2009; Dincec-
co et al., 2011; Dincecco and Prado, 2012; Scheve and Stasavage, 2010, 2012; Voigtländer and
Voth, 2013; Gennaioli and Voth, 2015). This difference matters. The inability to broaden the
tax base by moving from trade to income taxes has been related to the persistence of weak states
Herbst (2000).6 We provide new evidence on the relationship between warfare and the evolution
of sophisticated systems of taxation that provide a broader tax base and a more efficient way to
raise tax revenues.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature. Sec-
tion 3 introduces the time-varying city-level data providing us with information on German cities,
the conflicts they experienced, their political institutions, and the taxes they collect. It then de-
scribes the genealogical data on the German nobility, as well as the construction of nobility net-
work measures. The empirical strategy and results are described in section 4. We first describe the
instrumental variables strategy and then discuss the OLS and IV results for the effect of conflict
intensity on the inclusiveness and democratization of political institutions, and on state capacity as
measured by the number and types of taxes collected. The final section 5 concludes.
6Even nowadays poorer countries are characterized by a less sophisticated tax system and narrower tax bases,
suggesting a substantial role of taxation in development and growth (see Burgess and Stern, 1993).
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2 Related Literature
The historical roots of state capacity and its relationship with warfare is prominently studied by
Tilly (1975, 1990). He argues that the increasing cost of warfare following military innovations in
pre-modern Europe created a demand for more efficient means of extraction of war funds. It was
this need for extraction that gave rise to systems of taxation, the expansion of state capacity, and
the emergence of the nation state. Besley and Persson (2009, 2010) develop a formal theoretical
framework for modelling the determinants of state capacity.7 In their framework, warfare and
conflict are key drivers of the development of state capacity, as states develop centralized systems
of taxation to finance warfare. Inclusive political institutions can have an impact on state capacity
but are taken as exogenous. In theoretical work, the direction of causation in the nexus between
warfare, state capacity and inclusive political institutions is ambiguous.
Downing (1993) argues that states relying on internal sources of revenue during the military
revolution built extensive autocracies. A standing army could potentially be used for two purpos-
es. Professional soldiers sworn to the local ruler could not only deter and defend against outside
forces but could also be employed to oppress internal opposition from the local populace or elites.
Stasavage (2016), on the other hand, argues that the need to finance wars came with a trade-off for
rulers. To obtain more war funds rulers were compelled to offer their subjects a certain degree of
political power via representative institutions. This line of argumentation is particularly relevant
for Germany where the high degree of geographic fragmentation created relatively weak rulers.
Stasavage (2016, p.155) notes that: “the evidence suggests some causal link between warfare and
representative institutions, although of course we do not know in which direction causality runs.”
Studies of the nexus between warfare, state capacity, and democratic institutions are scarce.
A notable exception is Dincecco et al. (2011), who explore correlations between the threat of
external conflict, the need for taxation and subsequent constitutional reform in nineteenth-century
Italy. However, most previous work has considered either conflicts and institutions, or conflicts and
7Besley and Persson (2013) point out that fiscal capacity would be the more precise term to describe what is
typically coined state capacity.
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state capacity, but not the joint relation between the three. In a theoretical contribution, Gennaioli
and Voth (2015) model the effect of the military revolution on the need for increased state capacity
to finance wars. The need for fiscal innovations to raise war revenues is also emphasized by
Dincecco and Prado (2012) as key for the expansion of fiscal capacity. In a recent survey, Johnson
and Koyama (2017) highlight Prussia and Russia as prime examples of “fiscal military states par
excellence” due to the bellicose underpinnings of investments in state capacity in those regions.
The relationship between inclusive institutions and state capacity is, to our knowledge, less
well-studied. Karaman and Pamuk (2013) provide evidence that tax collection was done more ef-
ficiently by representative regimes in urban economies. Authoritarian regimes, on the other hand,
are shown to be more efficient at state building in rural and agrarian economies. In recent work,
Angelucci, Meraglia and Voigtländer (2018) present causal evidence that the self-administration
of tax collection in medieval English merchant towns was instrumental in creating more inclu-
sive institutions; these towns were later granted representation in Parliament to allow the king to
negotiate extraordinary taxes with them.
Finally, there is a large literature on the link between conflict (in a broad sense) and political
institutions. Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) develop a model where elites strategically grant
citizens the right to vote in order to avoid social unrest and revolution. This theory is brought
to the data by Aidt and Franck (2015), who show that the threat of revolution induced votes in
favor of democratization in the context of the British Great Reform Act of 1832. Most related to
this paper is the theoretical contribution by Ticchi and Vindigni (2008), who postulate a model in
which democratization follows endogenously from the need to conscript citizens to fight wars.
There is some evidence in the literature that suggests that both state capacity and inclusive
institutions are beneficial for historic economic development.8 Dincecco and Katz (2016) relate
state capacity improvements to long-run economic growth and Dincecco (2015) also to the es-
8We show evidence for an effect of wars on both state capacity and inclusive institutions. We thus provide evidence
for one pathway from wars to economic development, via state capacity and representative institutions. Of course,
there are alternative explanations how wars affected long-run development. Dincecco and Onorato (2017) argue that
cities grew faster as a result of wars as they offered a ’safe harbor’ against pillaging. Hoffman (2015) claims that
constant warfare led Europe to develop technologies that allowed it to conquer the rest of the world.
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tablishment of twentieth-century welfare states.9 Wahl (2018) shows that participative political
institutions had a positive effect on economic outcomes of German cities, with the exception of
craft guilds participating in the city council, which had had zero or negative impact.10 Our work
on the rise of state capacity and inclusive political institutions in the German lands is therefore
informative about two of the sources of the long-run development of the German economy.
The contribution of this paper is its focus on the nexus between warfare, state capacity and in-
clusive political institutions. To identify causal relationships between warfare and our outcomes of
interest, we turn to the literature on the determinants of historical conflict in Europe. In particular,
we propose an instrument for conflicts that uses shocks to the position of German nobles in the
wider European nobility network. Tilly (1975) notes a strong interrelation within the European
nobility, a fact which according to Benzell and Cooke (2018) explains the general decline in vio-
lent conflicts between European states. They construct a network of the European ruling families
and show that those with more interconnectedness tended to fight fewer wars. Polities governed by
female rulers, on the other hand, were more likely to engage in conflict (Dube and Harish, 2018.
Married queens were more effective at forging alliances and to use these strategically to fight wars.
The rich backdrop of nobility networks as a driver of war and peace in Europe informs our choice
of instrument, and is explained in more detail below.
3 Data
3.1 German City-Level Data
The main data source is the Deutsches Städtebuch (Encyclopedia of German Cities), a series of
volumes edited by Erich Keyser (1939-1974) that provide information on each city in the German
Empire incorporated prior to the compilation of the Städtebuch. The book offers a systematic
treatise of the history of German cities from their foundation until the twentieth century. A separate
9Borcan, Olsson and Putterman (2018) take a perspective over 6 millenia and show that the current level of eco-
nomic development across countries has a hump-shaped relationship with accumulated state history.
10This qualification on guilds supports Ogilvie (2014) who holds a skeptical view of guilds, because they typically
generated a particularized trust among its own members, but did not automatically support more generalized trust
supporting broader economic growth.
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article is devoted to each city, following a consistent structure that divides the city history into
twenty categories. These include sections on a city’s past names, its geographic location, its local
economy, educational and church systems, and so on. Particularly relevant for our purposes are
section nine on the administration of the city, section eleven on warfare and conflicts experienced
by the city, and section 13 on its financial system (including its means of taxation).
Political Institutions
We collect information on the different types and numbers of political institutions, as well as in-
formation on how and by whom the institutions were chosen. The types of political institutions we
consider are the executive (mayors, sheriffs), legislative (councils) and judiciary (judges) branches
of a city’s administration. Using information from the Städtebuch, for each institution we record
the year in which it is introduced or first mentioned, including start and (where applicable) end
dates, the number of people within a given institution,11 and the identity of members within each
institution. The latter information allows us to capture cases where, for instance, the mayor of a
city is also the judge or the head of the council. Finally, we collect data on the electing body for
each institution.12
In a given century, the majority of cities were ruled by lords or bishops and, as a result, not
fully self-governing.13 City councils, however, had legislative and administrative power in the
local context. Examining various characteristics of councils is therefore informative of the quality
and representativeness of local political institutions. To this end, we construct three main political
institution variables using the information collected from the Städtebuch. First, to capture the
opportunities for political participation by citizens, we define an indicator taking a value of one
if the council is directly elected by citizens without the interference of the local lord. Second, to
capture the strength and breadth of the council, we define a count variable of the number of council
11A council is typically composed of multiple members and, though less common, also several mayors, judges or
sheriffs could exist at the same point in time.
12Elections are classified into eight types: (i) direct elections by the citizens, (ii) by the citizens but with a final say
by the local lord, (iii) by the lord only, (iv) by the council, (v) by the council with a final say by the lord, (vi) elections
by other bodies (e.g. the court jury), (vii) unknown electoral bodies, or (viii) unknown electoral bodies with a final
say by the lord.
13The exception are imperial cities, which were entirely self-governed.
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members. Third, to capture the independence of the council and the division of power between the
branches of administration within a city, we define an indicator taking a value of one if a judge,
mayor or sheriff is a member of the council. Concretely, larger values of the first two variables and
smaller values of the third variable are indicative of more inclusive political institutions.
Conflicts
Our main explanatory variable is a measure of a city’s exposure to conflict. From the relevant
section of the Städtebuch, we record for each city the dates and durations of violent conflicts in
which the city was involved. The conflict information in the Städtebuch is detailed, and we are
able to classify each conflict according to its type. We capture involvements elsewhere (if the
city engaged in raids or wars in other territories), battles fought in the vicinity of the city, sieges,
sackings, partial destruction of the city, complete destruction of the city, and occupation. We
therefore have a rich set of information both on the occurrence of conflicts as well as their nature.
The level of detail with which we capture city-level instances of conflict is significantly more
comprehensive than other frequently used sources, such as Brecke (1999) and Clodfelter (2008).14
These sources begin in 1400 and 1494, respectively, while our data allows us to extend further
back in history. More importantly, these sources focus primarily on battles. While battles are no
doubt important considerations for local rulers, we are also able to capture concerns related to other
forms of conflict. Indeed, extensive sieges or occupations (which can last months, years, or even
decades) plausibly exert greater pressure on rulers to tax than more short-lived battle events.15
Taxation
The final component of the causal nexus we explore in this paper is state capacity. We focus on
fiscal capacity - the state’s ability to levy and collect taxes - and collect information on cities’
14Examples of the use of these battle datasets include Dincecco and Prado (2012), Kokkonen and Sundell (2017)
and Iyigun, Nunn and Qian (2017a,b)
15To illustrate the advantage of our data, consider the conflict data used by Iyigun et al. (2017b), which combines
Brecke (1999) and Clodfelter (2008). Their focus is on Europe, Northern Africa and the Near East during the period
1400-1900, for which they record a total of 2,787 battles. Our conflict data, which focuses on a much smaller ge-
ographical region (the German lands) records a total of 4,133 city-level conflict events for the same period. This is
illustrative of the greater local detail we capture. Of course, our temporal focus is slightly different: our sample period
consists of the years 1200-1750, during which we record a total of 3,582 city-level conflict events.
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taxation from the Städtebuch. Due to data availability we collect this information only for the
largest cities: the 267 German cities that appear in Bairoch et al. (1988). We are interested in
exploring not only the establishment of systems of taxation, but also their sophistication. To this
end, we categorize individual taxes into distinct types: (i) general taxation, such as head taxes and
taxes without a specifically stated purpose, (ii) taxes on obtaining or maintaining citizen rights
(Burgher taxes), (iii) property taxes (on houses or land inside the city), (iv) land taxes (on farms
or land outside the city), (v) income and wealth taxes, (vi) inheritance taxes, (vii) tax on alcoholic
beverages, (viii) business taxes (including taxes on guilds), and (ix) trade taxes, such as tariffs and
duties. We consider a tax to be sophisticated if the activity to be taxed is not easily observable.
Sophisticated taxes therefore include property taxes, income and wealth taxes, and inheritance
taxes.16 Unsophisticated taxes include general taxes, Burgher taxes, land taxes, alcohol taxes and
trade taxes.
3.2 Data on Sovereign Territories
We link cities from the Städtebuch to sovereign territories using the Euratlas (Nüssli, 2009). In
100-year intervals, we observe the borders of all sovereign states of Europe. This allows us to
geographically link each city in the Städtebuch to the territory to which it belonged each century.
Figure A1 shows the evolution of these territories as well as the (fixed) location of the 2,340 cities
in the Städtebuch.
3.3 Data on the German Nobility
To build a network of German nobility and link information about nobles to the cities in the Städte-
buch, we combine two data sources. The first is the Peerage project (Lundy, 2018) which stores
data on more than 680,000 European nobles. The Peerage database contains information on no-
bles’ dates of birth, death, and marriages. In addition, we collect basic information on sex and
age. Further, the Peerage contains information which allows us to link each noble to their parents,
siblings, spouses and children. As an example, Figure A2 shows The Peerage entry for Georg Wil-
16Business taxes could plausibly be considered sophisticated. In our empirical analysis, therefore, we consider
measures both including and excluding business taxes as sophisticated taxes.
11
helm, Duke of Braunschweig and Lüneburg. Based on this information, we are able to reconstruct
the European nobility network at any given point in time.
To supplement this data, we digitize information from the Europäische Stammtafeln (European
Family Trees, Schwennicke (1998)), in particular Volumes 1-1, 1-2 and 1-3. These volumes cover
379 family trees of ruling families in the German lands.17 Figure A3 shows an example of a family
tree for the dukes of Braunschweig and Lüneburg, and a detailed individual entry is shown in
Figure A4. Note that this entry is the same individual, Georg Wilhelm, as identified in the Peerage
example above. The Stammtafeln provide additional valuable information on locations of births,
deaths, marriages and other events, which allows us to link individual nobles to cities and territories
within the German lands. Where other information is missing in the Peerage, we also supplement
this with data from the Stammtafeln.
We use the information on the locations and lives of nobles to link them spatially and tem-
porally to the Städtebuch cities and Euratlas sovereign territories. We use the data on parental,
sibling and marital ties between nobles to reconstruct the network of the German nobility each
decade, yielding a potentially disconnected, undirected, unweighted graph.18 We compute several
statistics that characterize the network and nobles’ relative positions within it. A commonly used
measure of centrality is degree centrality: the number of direct links a noble has to other nobles.
This simple measure, however, fails to capture the complexities of nobility networks in this time
period. Rather, we would like to capture, for example, the importance of nobles whose links unite
two separate dynasties. To our knowledge, the most appropriate measure which is tractable for
disconnected networks is harmonic centrality, which is computed as:
H(x) =
∑
x 6=y
1
d(x, y)
(1)
17In our empirical analysis, we concentrate on the network positions of nobles from Volume 1-1 only. These are
nobles from the most important 174 ruling houses in the German lands, and therefore the key players determining war
and peace in this period.
18We consider each of the following relationships to constitute a direct link between nobles: parent, child, sibling,
spouse.
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The harmonic centrality H(x) is a measure of the distance of noble x to the rest of the network.
The pairwise shortest-path distance d(x, y) is calculated between x and each other noble y. A large
value for d(x, y) means that x is far from (and therefore poorly connected to) y. Taking the inverse
of this distance and summing over all nobles y yields an intuitive measure where larger values
correspond to higher centrality. Additionally, harmonic centrality provides a straightforward way
to allow for unconnected nodes in the graph. For any two unconnected nobles x and y, we set
d(x, y) = ∞ such that an unconnected noble-pair’s contribution to H(x) is zero. We calculate
this measure for each noble alive in a given decade using the full Peerage sample of 680,000
individuals. In Figure A5 we provide an example of the largest component of such a network
in the year 1460, with the most central nobles (according to the harmonic centrality measure)
highlighted.
3.4 Descriptive Statistics
For the majority of our analysis, we follow Cantoni, Dittmar and Yuchtman (2018) and drop cities
which are reported in a ’Small State of the Holy Roman Empire’ in the Euratlas. This leaves 1,472
cities which we observe at decadal intervals for the period 1200-1750. Descriptive statistics for the
cities in our main sample are reported in Panel A of Table 1. The first three variables capture the
presence of the three main institutional branches in each city-decade. Executive, judiciary and leg-
islative institutions are present in 47, 13 and 44 percent of city-decade observations, respectively.
Turning to measures of institutional quality, 5 percent of councils are elected directly by citizens,
and the average council has around 9 members. Finally, roughly one quarter of councils are not
fully independent. That is, a mayor, sheriff or judge is also a member of these councils.
Our main measure of conflict exposure is defined on the Euratlas territory level. Since war
and peace are determined by territorial lords, intuitively the impact of conflict will be felt in all
cities in a territory. Concretely, we use a measure of conflict intensity, which takes the share of
cities in a given territory that experience conflict in a given decade. The summary statistics for
this variable in Panel A of Table 1 reveal substantial variability: while the average city-decade is
relatively peaceful (only 2 percent of cities in its territory experienced conflict), there are periods
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of intense warfare (where all the cities in the territory experience conflict).
To measure nobility network centrality, we use the harmonic centrality of the best-connected
noble in a territory. We also construct the average degree centrality of nobles in a territory. Both
these variables can intuitively be set to zero for those cities in territories without any members of
the highest levels of aristocracy. The final four rows of Panel A of Table 1 report summary statistics
for these variables. There is considerable heterogeneity: some territories have very well-connected
nobles with a harmonic centrality four standard deviations above the mean, while some territories
have nobles without any links at all.
As explained above, we only observe taxation information for the larger cities in Bairoch et al.
(1988). Summary statistics for these cities are reported in Panel B of Table 1. For completeness,
we report the same variables as for the full sample in addition to the taxation variables. On average,
these cities have more well-developed political institutions. Since conflict and nobility measures
are defined at the territorial level, values for these variables are very similar to those in the full
sample. In the average Bairoch city-decade, 1.31 taxes are levied. There are predominantly ‘sim-
ple’ taxes, with ‘sophisticated’ taxes being relatively rare. These is considerable heterogeneity,
however: some cities have four times as many sophisticated taxes as simple taxes. This suggests
that in this time period, these larger cities were already beginning to develop relatively intricate
systems of taxation, which is indicative of high degrees of fiscal (state) capacity.
3.5 Motivational Evidence
Before describing our empirical strategy and presenting our results in Section 4 below, we conduct
a suggestive ‘event study’ exercise, using the Thirty Years’ War as a motivating example. In
particular, in Figures 1 and 2, we plot the evolution of citizens’ involvement in electing the council,
as well as the council size, separately for those cities that experienced and for those that did not
experience conflict during this intense period of warfare. Strikingly, cities that were spared conflict
stagnated in terms of their development of inclusive political institutions, in contrast to those cities
which did see conflict in this period. This exercise is informative but, of course, only suggestive.
We now turn to a formal empirical strategy with the aim of uncovering the joint causal effect of
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warfare on local political institutions and fiscal capacity.
4 Empirical Strategy and Results
To study the relationship between inclusive political institutions and the kinds of taxes raised by a
city with warfare in a sovereign territory, we regress
yist = αi + λt + βConflicts,t−1 +X ′istpi + ist (2)
where cities are indexed by subscripts i, sovereign states by s, and decades by t. We consider two
types of outcomes yist.
The first are measures of the inclusiveness of political institutions, such as an indicator for
whether citizens elect the council without interference of the local ruler, the size of the council,
and whether members of the judiciary or executive are present on the council and thus could
potentially exert influence on the legislative.
The second set of outcomes are the total number of different taxes raised by a city in a given
decade. Simple taxes include easily observed quantities like head taxes, alcohol, or trade taxes,
whereas sophisticated taxes require more elaborate enumeration of the population and their pos-
sessions. This includes wealth and income taxes, or inheritance taxes, i.e. assets that require more
effort to accurately observe by the authorities. The tax outcomes are only collected for the larger
Bairoch et al. (1988) cities.
The variable Conflicts,t−1 measures the conflict intensity in a given state in the previous decade.
This is to exclude the possibility that conflicts and changes in the outcome fall into the same decade
t in which case it would not be obvious whether a conflict actually predates the outcome change.19
Conflict intensity is defined as the number of cities in state s experiencing a violent conflict in
decade t over the total number of cities in that territory times one hundred. Territorial borders are
assigned to cities at the start of a given century. Border information is taken from the Euratlas.20
19For instance, a conflict may occur in 1404 while the political institution already changed in 1400, yet both events
would be labeled with the decade 1400.
20Since border changes are potentially endogenous to conflicts themselves, we later show robustness checks with
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The regression includes city fixed effects αi which capture time-invariant factors that lead to
differences in the outcomes across cities. Aggregate shocks over time that affect all cities are
absorbed by the decade fixed effects λt, whereas additional time varying city and institutional
characteristics are included in the vector Xist such as an indicator for whether a council is present
or the average number of direct nobility network links of nobles in a territory.
All other variation in the outcome is left in the stochastic error term ist. To account for het-
eroskedasticity and autocorrelation, we cluster standard errors at the territorial level. More pre-
cisely, we cluster observations at the level of ‘territorial histories’. That is, we generate clusters of
cities that shared the same history of territorial affiliations throughout our sample period.21
A concern with the baseline specification in (2) is that conflicts are potentially endogenous. Not
only is warfare a choice of the local rulers, but also the causality between conflicts and political
institutions may run both ways (Stasavage, 2016). For instance, autocratic regimes tend to be more
involved in conflict (Lake, 1992; Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson, 1995; Bueno de Mesquita,
Morrow, Siverson and Smith, 1999; Jackson and Morelli, 2007). As such a simple OLS regression
of eq. (2) would underestimate the true effect of wars on the development of inclusive political
institutions. We therefore attempt to resolve these potential issues via an instrumental variables
strategy.
4.1 First-Stage Relation between Nobility Network Centrality and Conflict Intensity
We use changes in the centrality of ruling families as shocks to the conflict intensities experienced
by German territories.22 As explained in Section 3 above, we track the position of German nobles
within the wider European nobility network, and compute measures of connectedness for these
nobles and link them to the cities and territories in our sample. More central nobles can build
on the support of a larger set of allies which makes attacking them relatively more costly for an
fixed borders by grouping together areas that have always belonged to the same states.
21For instance, if two cities were initially part of Duchy X and later on both part of Kingdom Y, they will be in the
same territorial history cluster.
22The idea is similar to that of Benzell and Cooke (2018), who use links between European ruling houses to explain
the aggregate decline in warfare propensity over the course of European history. Their analysis is on the level of
European countries, whereas our focus is on territories within the wider German lands.
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outside force.
The first stage regression to predict conflict intensities is specified as follows:
Conflicts,t−1 = αi + λt + γCentralitys,t−1 +X
′
istφ+ νst (3)
where Centralitys,t−1 is the harmonic centrality index value for the most connected noble in the
state in t − 1. The most influential noble would typically be the head of the ruling family.23 In
order to avoid concerns related to endogenously shifting borders, we assign the nobility centrality
measures on the level of the territorial history.
An important control in the vectorXist is the average direct connectedness of nobles in territory
s. Variation in the harmonic centrality index used to construct Centralitys,t−1 comes from two
sources. First, from the direct links of nobles in territory s with other nobles in the European
nobility network. Second, conditional on nobles’ direct links, centrality may also vary due to
changes in the structure of other parts of the network. It is this second type of variation which we
wish to exploit, since network changes unrelated to the direct links of a state’s nobility provide
shocks to centrality that are exogenous to local economic, political and strategic developments.
In short, by controlling for the direct links of a state’s nobility, we shut down the first source of
variation in Centralitys,t−1, and identify the first-stage relationship using variation from deeper in
the network structure.
To illustrate the chain between nobility, conflict and local political institutions, Figure A6 maps
the spatial relationships of the first stage between harmonic centrality and conflicts in the year
1630, at the height of the Thirty Years’ War. Figure A7 maps the raw spatial correlation between
conflict and the number of political institutions that are elected by citizens in the same year. Given
that this measure is computed for every state in each decade, there is no simple way of plotting
these relations over time. However, the example of the Thirty Years’ War in Figure A6 illustrates
the hypothesized (negative) relationships very clearly. Cities in areas with a high degree of central-
23Other measures of centrality, such as the average or median centrality of nobles in the territory, are possible. We
use such alternative methods to probe the robustness of our results.
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ity tend to be less affected by violent conflicts during this period of intense warfare. Conversely,
those with a low level of connectedness and a high warfare frequency show a higher propensity to
have elected institutions.
More formal estimations of the first-stage relationship between nobility centrality and conflict
intensity are reported in Table 2. In columns 1 and 2, we use the main nobility centrality defi-
nition in constructing our instrument: the harmonic centrality of the best-connected noble in the
territory. Harmonic centrality is a strong negative predictor of conflict intensity, both with and
without controls for immediate network links (degree centrality). A one-unit increase in the max-
imum harmonic centrality index of a given territory reduces its experienced conflict intensity by
1.3 percentage points.24
In the remaining columns of Table 2, we report first-stage results for alternative specifications
of the instrument. In columns 3 and 4, we use the average harmonic centrality of nobles in a ter-
ritory rather than the harmonic centrality of the best-connected noble. As additional an additional
robustness check, in columns 5 and 6 we use the centrality not of nobles in the territory itself, but of
nobles connected to nobles in the territory (we call these nobles linked nobles). Results are robust
to these alternative definitions of the instrument, and the key first-stage result holds: territories that
become less well-connected due to changes in the structure of the European nobility network see
increases in their levels of conflict intensity.
4.2 Conflict Intensity and Local Political Institutions
4.2.1 Conflict Intensity and Council Elections
We now use the first-stage relationship between nobility centrality and conflict intensity in the
instrumental variables framework described above to explore the relationship between warfare and
local political institutions. The first outcome we consider is whether a city’s citizens were involved
in electing local councils. Concretely, in equation 2 above, yist will be an indicator taking a value
of one if citizens elected the council without the interference of the local lord.
24The direction of this result is in agreement with results found by Benzell and Cooke (2018) for wars between
countries.
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Results from this exercise are reported in Table 3. In columns 1, we perform a simple OLS
estimation of equation 2, in which we regress an indicator for whether citizens elected the council
on the conflict intensity variable as well as city and decade fixed effects. Column 2 additionally
controls for the presence of a council.25 These estimates should be interpreted with caution, how-
ever, due to the likely downward bias arising from the reverse and negative relationship between
conflicts and political institutions (that is, autocratic rulers are also likely to be more belligerent).
Indeed, we do not find a systematic relationship between conflicts and council elections through a
simple OLS regression.
We therefore turn to the instrumental variables strategy explained above, where we use shocks
to nobility network centrality to generate exogenous variation in conflict intensity in a first stage.
Column 3 reports the result from a parsimonious second stage of this IV framework, with no
additional controls. We find a systematic positive relationship between conflict intensity and the
probability that citizens elect local councils. This relationship is robust to controlling for council
presence (column 4), and the immediate links of nobles in the territory (column 5).26 Finally, in
column 6 we include both controls, and still find a robust, positive effect of conflict intensity on
the probability that citizens elect the local council.
Concretely, for a percentage point increase in conflict intensity induced by a reduction in a
territory’s network centrality, the coefficient reported in column 6 shows a 0.003 percentage point
increase in the probability that citizens elect their council. The size of the estimated coefficient
needs to be assessed with respect to the overall magnitudes associated with a given outcome.
Relative to the average probability that citizens elect the local council, the effect reported in column
6 corresponds to a 12.6% increase.
To put this finding into context, consider that the average probability that citizens elected coun-
cils rose by 3.132% over the sample period, 1200-1750. Over the same period, the average city
25The establishment of a council is itself plausibly an outcome of conflict, which could raise concerns that it is a
bad control in this specification. To dispel such concerns, throughout we will report results both with and without this
control to show that results do not change.
26Recall that this allows us to exploit variation in network centrality arising only from changes in network structure
beyond local nobility links.
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experienced a conflict intensity of 2.360%. Using our estimate for the effect of conflict intensity
on the probability that citizens elect their council, we can explain 0.003576×2.360
0.03132
× 100 ≈ 27% of
the increase in council elections over the period 1200-1750.
4.2.2 Conflict Intensity and Council Size
Our second measure of political representativeness is the size of the city council, where larger
councils are taken to better represent the interest of the local citizenry. In our historical setting,
council expansions are often associated with greater direct representation of citizens. The city
of Braunschweig, for example, expanded its gemeine Rat (‘common council’) in 1386 to enable
direct representation of citizens from Braunschweig’s distinct municipal areas.27 We report results
using council size as the outcome of equation 2 in Table 4. As before, OLS results (columns 1 and
2) are likely biased downwards, but we nevertheless find a weakly positive, though insignificant,
impact of conflict exposure on council size. Turning to our instrumental variables specification,
we indeed find a larger and statistically significant effect.
Taking the richest specification in column 6, a one percentage point increase in conflict inten-
sity causes the council to expand by 0.3 members. When compared to the mean council size of
3.3 members, this effect corresponds to a 9.3% increase. In addition to being more democratically
chosen, as documented above, councils are therefore also becoming larger in size due to exposure
to conflict. Again, putting this finding into context, conflicts explain 0.452014×2.360
5.5008
× 100 ≈ 20% of
the increase in council size over the period 1200-1750.28
4.2.3 Conflict Intensity and Division of Power
As a final measure of the quality of local political institutions, we consider a measure of the division
of power between administrative branches in a city. In particular, if executive or judiciary branches
also gain influence in the council, then the council’s independence (and therefore its ability to
represent citizens effectively) is jeopardised. To this end, we construct an indicator equal to one if
27For the modern era, see Kjaer and Elklit (2014) for an empirical test of the relationship between assembly size
and representativeness.
28In our sample over the period 1200-1750, the average council size is 5.5008, the average conflict intensity is
2.36% and our estimation of the effect of conflict intensity on council size is 0.452.
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a mayor, sheriff or judge is part of the city council and thereby lessens the division of power within
the city.
Results from this exercise are reported in Table 5. The OLS regressions in columns 1 and 2
are once again likely to bias the estimated coefficient towards zero, so we immediately turn to the
instrumental variables results in columns 3- 6. Coefficients are stable with the successive inclusion
of controls, and are negative and statistically significant (or just-insignificant at conventional levels
in the richer specifications). This suggests that conflict exposure also improves the representative-
ness of political institutions by making councils more independent of other local political interests.
Taking the estimate from column 6, a one percentage point increase in conflict intensity decreases
the likelihood of overlap into the council by 19.6% relative to the mean.
Over the sample period 1200-1750, the probability that a city had a council with overlaps from
other branches of administration rose by 16.465%. Using our estimate for the effect of conflict
intensity on overlaps and the mean conflict intensity, conflicts over this period increased council
independence by 0.0165 × 2.360 ≈ 3.89%. Hence, in the absence of wars, council independence
would have decreased by an additional 3.89
16.465+3.89
× 100 ≈ 24% over this period.
4.3 Conflict Intensity and Local Fiscal Capacity
Does the increased democratization of political institutions come with a greater ability to tax citi-
zens? Due to data availability, we collected taxation outcomes only for the subsample of cities in
Bairoch et al. (1988). Table 6 shows the results of regressing the number of taxes levied by rulers
in these cities on conflict intensity. Since these tax regressions also suffer from similar endogeneity
concerns as the political institution regressions above, we again instrument for conflict intensity
using the centrality of German nobles. In order to implement our instrumental variables frame-
work, however, nobility data from all cities are required in order to capture the complete network
of German nobility and therefore accurately predict conflicts in a first stage. For this reason, we
use the two-sample 2SLS (TS2SLS) estimator, which estimates the first stage in the entire sample
and then uses the predicted conflict intensity values to estimate the second stage using the Bairoch
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subsample (Pacini and Windmeijer, 2016). These results are reported in Table 7.29
For both the OLS and the TS2SLS regressions, we report the contemporaneous effect of conflict
on taxation in period t in the top panels. The bottom panels show the long-term coefficient in
decade t+5 (fifty years later). This is because the short- and long-term response of the tax system
to violence can be different. In the short run, the effect of the conflict (which in our data are mainly
defensive in nature) may disrupt the system and lower the potential to tax due to destruction. In
this case, the total number of taxes levied would decrease.
Indeed, the results in Table 7 show a negative effect of conflict on the number of in the short
run. Notably, however, our measure of tax sophistication (the share of sophisticated taxes among
all taxes levied by the city) increases in response to conflict, as reported in column 2. Strikingly,
therefore, while conflict disrupts local systems of taxation, it directs efforts to tax into relatively
more sophisticated methods. This result is robust to alternative specifications of the share: in
column 3, we include general taxation in the denominator,30 and in column 4 we treat business
taxes as sophisticated.
While it is possible that a conflict may have been so severe as to send a city on a permanently
lower growth trajectory, it can also have acted as an incentive to improve systems of taxation.
Forward-looking rulers may seek to further develop the tax system in order to raise more funds for
defence in the future, in particular by developing more sophisticated means of taxation to offset
distortions created by an increased tax burden. Conflicts therefore potentially act as pressure to
improve the available taxation technology.
Our results bear out this hypothesis. The patterns in Table 7 suggest that, in the long run,
conflict negatively impacts the absolute number of taxes, but with simple taxes being replaced
by increasingly sophisticated methods of taxation. As a result, in the decades following periods
29We also estimate regressions for local political institutions for this subset of cities. As in the taxation regressions,
the analysis relies on the TS2SLS estimator in order to construct the first stage using the whole sample. Results are
reported in Table A1. Effects are in line with those found for the full sample, though the magnitude of the effects is
larger.
30General taxes have no direct interpretation as these are mainly an unlabeled kitchen-sink category. This happens
when the text in the Städtebuch mentions the introduction of a tax but without naming the tax or describing its purpose
any further.
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of conflict, cities’ tax systems stabilise at significantly higher levels of sophistication. Previous
work notes this relationship for modern national systems of taxation (Besley and Persson, 2009).
Our findings suggest that similar pressures also shaped local fiscal capacity in much earlier time
periods.31
Concretely, our baseline measure of tax sophistication rose by 16.341% percent over the period
1200-1750. Using the mean conflict intensity and our estimate for the impact of conflict on tax
sophistication, conflicts explain 3.913×2.360
16.341
× 100 ≈ 57% of this increase.32
4.4 Robustness Checks
To assess the robustness of our results, we next relax assumptions made on the assignment of
borders, the assignment of the conflict variable to the city- rather than the territory-level, the def-
inition of the instrument, and the sample composition regarding the treatment of cities located in
the so-called small states category.
4.4.1 Conflict Intensity Using Fixed Territorial Borders
Tables A2 and A3 report results for political institutions and tax outcomes with conflicts assigned
using fixed borders. Since border changes are potentially endogenous to conflicts, we fix the border
definition to territorial histories.33 This means that we only consider borders that only contained
the same set of cities over the sample period. The results are almost identical with the benchmark
results which is true for both the political institutions as well as the tax outcomes.
31To explore what drives the increase in the share, we investigate the effect on the number of simple and sophisti-
cated taxes separately. In the short run, conflict reduces both types of taxation, but simple forms of taxation fall much
more sharply, therefore driving up the share of sophisticated taxes. In the long run, conflict reduces the number of
simple taxes, while increasing the number of sophisticated taxes.
32Using an alternative measure of sophisticated taxes (which includes general taxation as a ‘simple’ tax), conflicts
explain 1.042×2.3607.4811 × 100 ≈ 33% of the increase in tax sophistication.
33With time-varying borders, a concern could be that periods of warfare both increase the numerator (more cities in
a territory see conflict) and lower the denominator (territories lose cities) of the conflict intensity measure. This would
cause us to systematically overstate conflict intensity. Fortunately, our results are almost identical when using fixed
borders, suggesting that this is not a major concern.
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4.4.2 Conflict Exposure at the City Level
So far, we have assigned conflicts at territory levels. The reasoning behind this is that cities’
decisions depend not only on actual conflict, but on the threat of conflict (for which the overall
conflict intensity of the territory is a good measure). Are the effects of conflicts different when
measured at the city level? To test this, in Table A4 we measure conflict at the city level: the
conflict treatment is now an indicator taking a value of one if the city is exposed to conflict in a
given decade. At first, these coefficients appear to be much larger. However, since conflicts at
the city-level are now measured as an indicator variable, experiencing a conflict corresponds to
an increase in the previously used conflict intensity measure from 0 to 100%. For this reason,
when the effect is normalised with respect to the mean, it is comparable to the benchmark results
presented above.
4.4.3 Different Nobility Centrality Instruments
To probe for the robustness with respect to the definition of our instrument, we consider the fol-
lowing changes in defining the nobility centrality instrument. First, instead of taking the maxi-
mum centrality of nobles in a territory we consider the average centrality in Table A5. The most
connected noble is important for determining the relationship between network centrality and con-
flicts, as shown in the benchmark results. However, it is possible that several influential individ-
uals also drive this relationship, which would not be picked up when considering only the most
well-connected noble. The results reported in Table A5 are statistically indistinguishable from the
benchmark results.
The creation of links in a network is a potential choice of nobles. In our benchmark estimates,
we control for changes in centrality stemming from nobles’ immediate links by controlling for
their degree centrality. A further check to shut down this channel is to consider nobles’ network
neighbours directly. In Tables A6 and A7 we use the maximum and average connectedness of
a nobles’ intermediate neighbours in the network. We call these neighbours linked nobles. A
reduction in a noble’s neighbour’s centrality is unlikely to be the noble’s own choice, but might
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still affect his or her conflict exposure.34 The results in Tables A6 and A7 are similar to the
benchmark results both in terms of the first and the second stage results. The choice of which
nobles to use with respect to the formation or breaks of their networks therefore does not appear
to substantially affect our results.
4.4.4 Keeping Cities in ‘Small States’
As described in Section 3 above, our benchmark estimates omit cities in small ‘Small States of
the Holy Roman Empire’ following Cantoni et al. (2018). Table A8 repeats the main analysis
on the political institution outcomes including these cities. The signs of all coefficients remain
unchanged, although the magnitude and significance for the council size and division of power
outcomes drop. This is likely due to the noise added by the small state cities for which border
assignments cannot be accurately made.35 The result on citizens electing their council following a
conflict is as before. The results are therefore not entirely explained away by the inclusion these
cities, yet the results confirm our reasoning for excluding them from the main estimation sample.
4.4.5 Dropping Individual Centuries
Finally, we test for the sensitivity of our results to events in specific centuries by repeating the
political institution regressions while excluding each century one-by-one. The results are reported
in Table A9, where each panel represents one of the three political institution outcomes, and each
column shows the omitted century in a given regression. Results are mostly stable, significant and
comparable to the main results for almost all of the excluded centuries. The only period which
has a marked impact on our results is the 17th century in column 5 without which results not only
become significantly larger but also noisier.
34Through mutual assistance pacts where a noble has to help in their neighbour’s defence or military campaign, for
example.
35In particular, it becomes less straight-forward to determine which cities truly belong to the same territory, hence
including these cities introduces measurement error in the conflict variable.
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5 Conclusion
We take a novel perspective on the rise of inclusive political institutions and state capacity by
looking at the local level over 550 years. At the local level, participation of different groups in
political institutions pre-dates the rise of regional or national assemblies, and can be considered
one precursor on the way to more inclusive institutions at all levels of governance. Using novel
city-level data from the German lands, we she new light on the causal link between warfare and
local political institutions and (local) fiscal capacity.
We combine city-level information on battles, existence and features of city councils, as well as
various tax types, with rich data on the centrality of German nobles in the wider European nobility
network. A reduction in the centrality of nobles following changes in the structure of the nobility
network leads to a greater conflict intensity in the affected territories. Higher conflict intensity,
in turn, shifts towards more sophisticated taxes, confirming (Tilly, 1990) hypothesis that warfare
underpins the expansion of the fiscal capacity of states. Furthermore, we show that conflict had
important effects on early forms of local democratization: councils increasingly were elected by
citizens, were larger in size, and were more likely to be independent of other institutions as a result
of episodes of conflict. This is consistent with there being an often-hypothesized tradeoff: in order
to expand the fiscal capacity of their polities to fund wars, rulers had to make concessions to their
subjects by democratizing political institutions.
Taken together, these results paint a clear picture of the central role of warfare in shaping the
course of development in the German lands.
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Figures
Figure 1: Involvement in the Thirty Years’ War and Citizens’ Elections of Councils
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Note: Evolution of probability that citizens elect council. Averages shown over time separately for those cities that did (red) and did not (blue)
experience conflict during the Thirty Years’ War (marked with vertical red lines).
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Figure 2: Involvement in the Thirty Years’ War and Council Size
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Note: Evolution of the size of the council. Averages shown over time separately for those cities that did (red) and did not (blue) experience conflict
during the Thirty Years’ War (marked with vertical red lines).
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Tables
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Panel A: Full Sample
Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Has executive 33076 0.47 0.50 0 1
Has judiciary 33076 0.13 0.34 0 1
Has council 33076 0.44 0.50 0 1
Council elected by citizens 33076 0.02 0.15 0 1
Council elected by citizens (cond. on having council) 14453 0.05 0.22 0 1
Council size 33076 3.91 8.66 0 341
Council size (cond. on having council) 14453 8.79 11.27 0 341
Exec. or judic. overlap with council 33076 0.11 0.32 0 1
Exec. or judic. overlap with council (cond. on having council) 14453 0.26 0.44 0 1
Share of cities in territory involved in conflict (%) 33076 2.32 6.05 0 100
Harmonic centr. of best-connected noble in territory 33076 22.38 27.08 0 148
Harm. centr. of best-conn. noble in terr. (cond. on having nobles) 28438 25.69 27.54 0 148
Average degree centr. of nobles in territory 33076 0.26 0.56 0 13
Av. degree centr. of nobles in terr. (cond. on having nobles) 28438 0.30 0.59 0 13
Panel B: Bairoch Sample
Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Has executive 4760 0.68 0.47 0 1
Has judiciary 4760 0.22 0.41 0 1
Has council 4760 0.70 0.46 0 1
Council elected by citizens 4760 0.04 0.20 0 1
Council elected by citizens (cond. on having council) 3331 0.06 0.24 0 1
Council size 4760 10.61 15.91 0 341
Council size (cond. on having council) 3331 14.98 17.17 0 341
Exec. or judic. overlap with council 4760 0.24 0.43 0 1
Exec. or judic. overlap with council (cond. on having council) 3331 0.34 0.47 0 1
Share of cities in territory involved in conflict (%) 4760 2.40 6.25 0 100
Harmonic centr. of best-connected noble in territory 4760 21.55 27.28 0 148
Harm. centr. of best-conn. noble in terr. (cond. on having nobles) 3885 26.18 28.02 0 148
Average degree centr. of nobles in territory 4760 0.36 0.83 0 13
Av. degree centr. of nobles in terr. (cond. on having nobles) 3885 0.44 0.90 0 13
Total number of taxes 4760 1.31 2.03 0 14
Number of simple taxes 4760 0.95 1.45 0 11
Number of sophisticated taxes 4760 0.22 0.59 0 4
Ratio sophisticated : simple taxes 1350 38.58 70.25 0 400
Note: The full sample (Panel A) covers the 1472 cities in the Städtebuch that are not in a ’Small State of the Holy Roman Empire’ in the Euratlas
at a decadal basis over the period 1200-1750. The Bairoch sample (Panel B) covers the subset of cities also in Bairoch et al. (1988). Variables
are defined as follows. Political institution variables: ’Has executive’ is a binary variables equal to one if the city has a mayor or sheriff. ’Has
judiciary’ is a binary variable equal to one if the city has a judge. ’Has council’ is a binary variable equal to one if the city has a council. ’Council
elected by citizens’ is a binary variable equal to one if the city has a council which is elected by citizens without the interference of the local lord.
’Council size’ is a count variable of the number of members on the council. ’Exec. or judic. overlap with council’ is a binary variable equal to
one if the mayor, sheriff or judge is a council member. Conflict variables: ’Share of cities in territory involved in conflict’ is the count of cities in
the territory involved in conflict divided by the total number of cities in territory. Nobility variables: ’Harmonic centrality of best-connected noble
in territory’ is the maximum harmonic centrality observed for a noble associated with the territory (see text for details on calculating harmonic
centrality. ’Average degree centr. of nobles in territory’ is the average number of links that nobles in the territory have to other nobles. Taxation
variables: ’Total number of taxes’ is a count of the taxes that are active in the city. ’Number of simple taxes’ and ’Number of sophisticated taxes’
break these down into two distinct classifications (see text for a discussion). ’Ratio sophisticated : simple taxes’ divides the number of sophisticated
taxes by the number of simple taxes. 33
Table 2: First Stage - Nobility Centrality and Conflict
Dependent Variable: Conflict Intensity (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Max. Harmonic Centrality -0.013∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004)
Avg. Harmonic Centrality -0.015∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.004)
Max. Harmonic Centrality (Linked Nob.) -0.012∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004)
Degree Centrality -0.034 -0.016 -0.046
(0.171) (0.165) (0.173)
Observations 33,076 33,076 33,076 33,076 33,076 33,076
Territories 157 157 157 157 157 157
Cities 1,472 1,472 1,472 1,472 1,472 1,472
Outcome mean 2.182 2.182 2.182 2.182 2.182 2.182
Note: First stage regressions of the form Conflicts,t−1 = αi + λt + γCentralitys,t−1 + X′istφ + νst. Conflict Intensity (%) is the share of
cities in a territory that are involved in conflict in a given decade. Harmonic Centrality measures the centrality of a territory’s nobles within the
wider European nobility network (see text for details). Degree Centrality measures a territory’s nobles’ direct links to other nobles. All regressions
include city and decade fixed effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the territorial history level. Significance levels
are denoted by * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 3: Second Stage - Conflict and Council Elections
Dependent Variable: Citizens Elect Council (1 = yes)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS IV IV IV IV
Conflict Intensity t-1 (%) 0.000 0.000 0.004∗ 0.003∗ 0.003∗ 0.003∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Council Present (1=yes) 0.028∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Degree Centrality -0.001 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003)
Observations 33,076 33,076 33,076 33,076 33,076 33,076
Territories 157 157 157 157 157 157
Cities 1,472 1,472 1,472 1,472 1,472 1,472
Outcome mean 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024
Kleibergen-Paap F stat 10.213 10.183 10.322 10.272
β × 100/(outcome mean) 14.906 14.146 13.918 12.616
Note: OLS and IV regressions of the form yist = αi+λt+βConflicts,t−1+X′istpi+ ist. Citizens Elect Council is an indicator variable taking
a value of one if citizens of a city elect the council without the interference of the local lord. Conflict Intensity (%) is the share of cities in a territory
that are involved in conflict in a given decade, and is instrumented using the Harmonic Centrality of the most central noble in the territory (see text
and Table 2 for details). Council Present is an indicator variable taking a value of one if a council is present in the city. Degree Centrality measures
a territory’s nobles’ direct links to other nobles. All regressions include city and decade fixed effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses
and are clustered at the territorial history level. Significance levels are denoted by * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 4: Second Stage - Conflict and Council Size
Dependent Variable: Size of Council
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS IV IV IV IV
Conflict Intensity t-1 (%) 0.010 0.009 0.452∗ 0.412∗∗ 0.370∗ 0.301∗
(0.009) (0.007) (0.240) (0.201) (0.210) (0.163)
Council Present (1=yes) 6.169∗∗∗ 6.146∗∗∗ 6.162∗∗∗
(0.455) (0.444) (0.447)
Degree Centrality -0.233 -0.315
(0.243) (0.212)
Observations 33,076 33,076 33,076 33,076 33,076 33,076
Territories 157 157 157 157 157 157
Cities 1,472 1,472 1,472 1,472 1,472 1,472
Outcome mean 3.229 3.229 3.229 3.229 3.229 3.229
Kleibergen-Paap F stat 10.213 10.183 10.322 10.272
β × 100/(outcome mean) 14.000 12.757 11.466 9.336
Note: OLS and IV regressions of the form yist = αi + λt + βConflicts,t−1 + X′istpi + ist. Council Size is a count variable of the number
of members of the city council. Conflict Intensity (%) is the share of cities in a territory that are involved in conflict in a given decade, and is
instrumented using the Harmonic Centrality of the most central noble in the territory (see text and Table 2 for details). Council Present is an
indicator variable taking a value of one if a council is present in the city. Degree Centrality measures a territory’s nobles’ direct links to other
nobles. All regressions include city and decade fixed effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the territorial history
level. Significance levels are denoted by * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 5: Second Stage - Conflict and Division of Power
Dependent Variable: Executive or Judiciary Overlaps with Council (1 = yes)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS IV IV IV IV
Conflict Intensity t-1 (%) -0.000 -0.000 -0.016∗ -0.018∗ -0.013 -0.016
(0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Council Present (1=yes) 0.247∗∗∗ 0.248∗∗∗ 0.247∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.046) (0.046)
Degree Centrality 0.010 0.007
(0.007) (0.007)
Observations 33,076 33,076 33,076 33,076 33,076 33,076
Territories 157 157 157 157 157 157
Cities 1,472 1,472 1,472 1,472 1,472 1,472
Outcome mean 0.081 0.081 0.081 0.081 0.081 0.081
Kleibergen-Paap F stat 10.213 10.183 10.322 10.272
β × 100/(outcome mean) -20.457 -22.464 -16.184 -19.613
Note: OLS and IV regressions of the form yist = αi + λt + βConflicts,t−1 + X′istpi + ist. Executive or Judiciary Overlaps with Council
(‘Division of Power’) is an indicator variable taking a value of one if the executive or judiciary branches of city administration overlap with the
council (see text for details). Conflict Intensity (%) is the share of cities in a territory that are involved in conflict in a given decade, and is
instrumented using the Harmonic Centrality of the most central noble in the territory (see text and Table 2 for details). Council Present is an
indicator variable taking a value of one if a council is present in the city. Degree Centrality measures a territory’s nobles’ direct links to other
nobles. All regressions include city and decade fixed effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the territorial history
level. Significance levels are denoted by * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 6: Conflict and Taxation - OLS
Short-Run Effect on Taxes in t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
No. of all
Taxes
Share of
sophist. Taxes
Share of
sophist. Taxes
(alt.)
Share of
sophist. Taxes
incl. Business
Conflict Intensity t-1 -0.000 0.035 0.067 0.120
(0.004) (0.222) (0.074) (0.211)
Observations 4,760 1,336 2,142 1,336
Territories 96 53 71 53
Outcome mean 1.005 31.438 14.104 47.851
β × 100/(outcome mean) -0.005 0.112 0.477 0.250
Long-Run Effect on Taxes in t+ 5
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Conflict Intensity t-1 0.002 0.124 -0.009 0.229
(0.003) (0.156) (0.041) (0.177)
Observations 4,101 1,214 1,941 1,214
Territories 93 51 70 51
Outcome mean 1.055 31.872 14.334 48.118
β × 100/(outcome mean) 0.179 0.389 -0.062 0.477
Note: OLS regressions of the form yist = αi + λt + βConflicts,t−1 +X′istpi + ist. No. of all taxes counts the total number of taxes levied in
a city in a given decade. Share of sophisticated taxes is the share of sophisticated to simple taxes (see text for details). Conflict Intensity (%) is the
share of cities in a territory that are involved in conflict in a given decade. All regressions include city and decade fixed effects. Standard errors are
reported in parentheses and are clustered at the city level. Significance levels are denoted by * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 7: Conflict and Taxation - Instrumental Variables
Short-Run Effect on Taxes in t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
No. of all
Taxes
Share of
sophist. Taxes
Share of
sophist. Taxes
(alt.)
Share of
sophist. Taxes
incl. Business
Conflict Intensity t-1 -0.105∗∗∗ 3.987∗∗∗ 1.064∗∗∗ 3.676∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.493) (0.189) (0.402)
Observations 4,760 1,350 2,149 1,350
Territories 96 59 73 59
Kleibergen-Paap F stat 15.447 15.447 15.447 15.447
Outcome mean 1.005 31.438 14.104 47.851
β × 100/(outcome mean) -10.495 12.684 7.542 7.682
Long-Run Effect on Taxes in t+ 5
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Conflict Intensity t-1 -0.031∗ 7.827∗∗∗ 2.460∗∗∗ 11.047∗∗∗
(0.019) (1.137) (0.368) (1.367)
Observations 4,112 1,230 1,957 1,230
Territories 96 60 75 60
Kleibergen-Paap F stat 15.447 15.447 15.447 15.447
Outcome mean 1.055 31.872 14.334 48.118
β × 100/(outcome mean) -2.960 24.559 17.163 22.958
Note: Two-Sample 2SLS regressions of the form yist = αi + λt + βConflicts,t−1 + X′istpi + ist. No. of all taxes counts the total number
of taxes levied in a city in a given decade. Share of sophisticated taxes is the share of sophisticated to simple taxes (see text for details). Conflict
Intensity (%) is the share of cities in a territory that are involved in conflict in a given decade, and is instrumented using the Harmonic Centrality
of the most central noble in the territory (see text and Table 2 for details). All regressions include city and decade fixed effects. Standard errors are
reported in parentheses and are clustered at the city level. Significance levels are denoted by * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Appendix: Additional Figures and Tables
Figure A1: Sovereign Territories in the German Lands, 1300-1800
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Note: Fixed locations of Stad¨tebuch cities (black dots). Sovereign territories from Euratlas outlined each century (red lines). Sovereign territories
are used to assign nobility network shocks and conflict intensity treatments to Keyser cities (see text for details).
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Figure A2: The Peerage Example
Note: Example from Darryl Lundy’s genealogical website The Peerage (http://www.thepeerage.com/, accessed 04/11/2017) for Georg Wilhelm,
Duke of Braunschweig and Lüneburg. Georg Wilhelm is one of the over 680,000 nobles we use to reconstruct the European nobility network each
year (see text for details).
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Figure A3: Family Tree Example - The Lords of Braunschweig and Lüneburg, 1582-1698
Note: Family tree example from the Europäische Stammtafeln (Schwennicke, 1998). Life events are represented by the following symbols for birth
*, deaths †, marriage ◦◦, burial <=, battle deaths are marked by two crossed swords. We use these family trees primarily to associate nobles to cities
and territories within the German lands, but also to supplement the information from the Peerage.
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Figure A4: Family Tree - Individual Entry
Note: Individual entry within a family tree (zoomed in) from the
Europäische Stammtafeln (Schwennicke, 1998). The example shows
Georg Wilhelm of the House of Braunchweig and Lüneburg. The
most relevant information of the entry include the cities of residences
and death, year of birth, marriage, and death, the name and title of his
wife and her family (Eleonore Desmier d’Olbreuse).
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Figure A5: Example Nobility Network and Most Central Individuals, 1460
Albrecht III Achilles Kurfürst von Brandenburg Anne Prinzessin von Sachsen
Friedrich II Kurfürst von Sachsen Margarete von Habsburg
Note: An example of a nobility network in the year 1460 (only the largest component shown). The four most central individuals (as measured by
harmonic centrality, see text) highlighted. Nodes positioned for visualisation purposes using multidimensional scaling (node positions therefore do
not correspond, for example, to geographic locations of nobles).
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Figure A6: Spatial Distribution of City Network Centrality and Conflicts
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Note: Spatial relationship between cities’ nobles’ harmonic centrality and the occurrence of violent conflicts in the cross-section of 1630 in the
German lands.
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Figure A7: Spatial Distribution of Elected Institutions and Conflicts
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Note: Spatial relationship between cities’ exposure to conflict and institutions elected by citizens in the cross-section of 1630 in the German lands.
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Table A1: Institutions Results for Bairoch Cities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Citizens elect
Council
Council
Size
Division of
Power
Citizens elect
Council
Council
Size
Division of
Power
Conflict Intensity t-1 0.010∗∗∗ 0.764∗∗∗ -0.036∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.235∗ -0.034∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.149) (0.008) (0.002) (0.138) (0.008)
Observations 4,760 4,760 4,760 4,760 4,760 4,760
Territories 96 96 96 96 96 96
Cities 196 196 196 196 196 196
Kleibergen-Paap F stat 16.073 16.073 16.073 14.993 14.993 14.993
Outcome mean 0.024 3.229 0.081 0.024 3.229 0.081
β × 100/(outcome mean) 40.150 23.675 -44.483 48.792 7.283 -42.379
Degree centr. control Yes Yes Yes
Note: Two-Sample 2SLS regressions of the form yist = αi+λt+βConflicts,t−1+X′istpi+ ist. Citizens Elect Council is an indicator variable
taking a value of one if citizens of a city elect the council without the interference of the local lord. Council Size is a count variable of the number of
members of the city council. Executive or Judiciary Overlaps with Council (‘Division of Power’) is an indicator variable taking a value of one if the
executive or judiciary branches of city administration overlap with the council (see text for details). Conflict Intensity (%) is the share of cities in a
territory that are involved in conflict in a given decade, and is instrumented using the Harmonic Centrality of the most central noble in the territory
(see text and Table 2 for details). All regressions include city and decade fixed effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered
at the territorial history level. Significance levels are denoted by * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table A3: Taxation Results with Conflicts Assigned at Fixed Territory Borders
Short-Run Effect on Taxes in t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
No. of all
Taxes
No. of simple
Taxes
No. of
sophisticated
Taxes
Share of
sophist. Taxes
Conflict Intensity t-1 -0.083∗∗∗ 3.156∗∗∗ 0.842∗∗∗ 2.909∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.412) (0.155) (0.328)
Observations 4,760 1,350 2,149 1,350
Territories 96 59 73 59
Kleibergen-Paap F stat 13.911 13.911 13.911 13.911
Outcome mean 1.005 31.438 14.104 47.851
β × 100/(outcome mean) -8.307 10.039 5.969 6.080
Long-Run Effect on Taxes in t+ 5
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Conflict Intensity t-1 -0.025∗ 6.195∗∗∗ 1.947∗∗∗ 8.744∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.991) (0.309) (1.199)
Observations 4,112 1,230 1,957 1,230
Territories 96 60 75 60
Kleibergen-Paap F stat 13.911 13.911 13.911 13.911
Outcome mean 1.055 31.872 14.334 48.118
β × 100/(outcome mean) -2.343 19.438 13.585 18.172
Note: Two-Sample 2SLS regressions of the form yist = αi + λt + βConflicts,t−1 + X′istpi + ist. No. of all taxes counts the total number
of taxes levied in a city in a given decade. Share of sophisticated taxes is the share of sophisticated to simple taxes (see text for details). Conflict
Intensity (%) is the share of cities in a territory that are involved in conflict in a given decade, and is instrumented using the Harmonic Centrality
of the most central noble in the territory (see text and Table 2 for details). All regressions include city and decade fixed effects. Standard errors are
reported in parentheses and are clustered at the territorial history level. Significance levels are denoted by * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table A9: 2SLS Institutions Results Excluding Centuries One-by-One
Panel A: Citizens Elect Council
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1200 1300 1400 1500 1600 1700
Conflict Intensity t-1 0.002 0.004∗ 0.002 0.003∗ 0.019 0.004∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.031) (0.002)
Observations 30,422 28,733 28,061 25,683 24,784 27,662
Territories 156 155 153 150 136 140
Cities 1,461 1,441 1,447 1,414 1,365 1,358
Kleibergen-Paap F stat 9.781 8.587 12.452 7.474 0.435 7.326
Outcome mean 0.026 0.025 0.023 0.022 0.022 0.022
β × 100/(outcome mean) 8.464 14.243 9.961 15.119 88.494 16.948
Panel B: Council Size
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1200 1300 1400 1500 1600 1700
Conflict Intensity t-1 0.262∗ 0.380∗ 0.324∗∗ 0.372∗∗ 2.108 0.513∗∗
(0.154) (0.194) (0.161) (0.185) (3.227) (0.254)
Observations 30,422 28,733 28,061 25,683 24,784 27,662
Territories 156 155 153 150 136 140
Cities 1,461 1,441 1,447 1,414 1,365 1,358
Kleibergen-Paap F stat 9.781 8.587 12.452 7.474 0.435 7.326
Outcome mean 3.620 3.465 3.219 2.967 2.805 2.953
β × 100/(outcome mean) 7.249 10.960 10.075 12.541 75.151 17.364
Panel C: Division of Power
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1200 1300 1400 1500 1600 1700
Conflict Intensity t-1 -0.019∗∗ -0.018∗ -0.012 -0.019∗∗ -0.066 -0.018∗
(0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.120) (0.009)
Observations 30,422 28,733 28,061 25,683 24,784 27,662
Territories 156 155 153 150 136 140
Cities 1,461 1,441 1,447 1,414 1,365 1,358
Kleibergen-Paap F stat 9.781 8.587 12.452 7.474 0.435 7.326
Outcome mean 0.091 0.089 0.081 0.075 0.068 0.071
β × 100/(outcome mean) -20.404 -20.176 -14.355 -24.910 -96.421 -25.265
Note: Each column re-runs the 2SLS analysis between the three institutional outcomes in panels A, B, and C, while dropping observations from a
given century. The omitted century is specified in the column header and years refer to the beginning of a century, i.e. 1500 means 1500 to 1599. IV
regressions of the form yist = αi+λt+βConflicts,t−1+X′istpi+ist. Conflict Intensity (%) is the share of cities in a territory that are involved
in conflict in a given decade, and is instrumented using the Harmonic Centrality of the most central noble in the territory (see text and Table 2 for
details). Citizens Elect Council is an indicator variable taking a value of one if citizens of a city elect the council without the interference of the
local lord. Council Size is a count variable of the number of members of the city council. Executive or Judiciary Overlaps with Council (‘Division
of Power’) is an indicator variable taking a value of one if the executive or judiciary branches of city administration overlap with the council (see
text for details). All regressions include city and decade fixed effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the territorial
history level. Significance levels are denoted by * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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